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Abstract
This paper studies the provision of incentives in a universal bank. This is regarded as a
(common) agent serving different clients with potentially conﬂicting interests: for example, it
may buy assets on behalf of investors and sell assets on behalf of issuing ﬁrms. The clients
offer incentive schemes to the bank and they behave non-cooperatively. The bank decides a
level of effort and, when ﬁrewalls are absent, a level of collusion, modelled as a costly and
unproductive redistribution of wealth among the clients. The main conclusion is that in the
absence of ﬁrewalls the equilibrium incentive schemes are steeper. This means that the level
of effort is higher and may compensate the (ex post) inefﬁciency of collusion. Moreover, this
is shown not to hold in the presence of one naive player who does not recognize the existence
of the conﬂict of interest. The model allows to draw conclusions about the desirability of
ﬁrewalls or of softer measures like the imposition of transparency requirements.
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∗ Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department1. Introduction
This article is about the provision of incentives in the activity of universal banks,
generally intended as institutions providing different services to different types of clients, with
potentially conﬂicting interests.
1
This is an old and important issue; it has motivated a large body of economic literature
dating back to the great depression, as a consequence of which American regulators decided
to ban universal banks, viewed as one of the main causes.
2 As in previous episodes of ﬁnancial
turmoil, the interest in this topic has been recently revived by the burst of the stock market
speculative bubble in March 2000.
Most of the existing works consider speciﬁc issues relating to the behaviour of universal
banks. Many analyses have been conducted in order to assess under what conditions it is
efﬁcient to let commercial banks take equity positions in other ﬁrms. An important example is
Boyd, Chang and Smith (1998), in which universal banks, by holding also equity, exacerbate
the moral hazard afﬂicting the institution that provides deposit insurance.
3
More recently, attention has been drawn to other speciﬁc instances of conﬂicts of
interest potentially affecting the way universal banks operate. These include virtually any
combination of the following activities: underwriting, lending, research, ﬁnancial advice,
and asset management. For example, ﬁnancial analysts might be tempted to overestimate
future earnings of a company which is being taken public by an afﬁliated investment bank.
Alternatively, a bank providing ﬁnancial consulting could be excessively eager to promote
securities of ﬁrms that are borrowing from an afﬁliated commercial bank. Finally, an
investment bank underwriting shares could make the afﬁliated mutual fund buy these securities
at unfair conditions.
4
1 I would like to thank two anonymous referees and Mathias Dewatripont, my supervisor at Ecares. Thanks
also to Michel Habib, Giuseppe Grande, Giovanni Guazzarotti, Andrea Lamorgese, Tymoﬁy Mylovanov, Giu-
liana Palumbo, Fabio Panetta, Urs Peyer and the other participants at the Bank of Italy seminar, at the CEPR-
BBVA conference on universal banks in Madrid, and at the 2005-EEA meeting in Amsterdam for their useful
and detailed comments. All errors are mine. The opinions expressed do not necessarily coincide with those of
the Bank of Italy. Email address: ugo.albertazzi@bancaditalia.it.
2 The Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933.
3 An extensive overview of the older literature on universal banks can be found in Benston (1994).
4 A recent and complete survey on these issues can be found in Crockett, Harris, Mishkin and White (2003).8
These remarks raise some important questions. Despite all these potential inefﬁciencies,
why aren’t universal banks simply banned? Is it political myopia or does it reﬂect the fact
that these regulations imply some costs? Moreover, why did regulators react to the recent
wave of scandals in a softer manner, that is by imposing transparency requirements, rather
than imposing tougher measures in the spirit of the Glass-Steagall Act?
The present work develops a general and stylized framework which helps to answer
these questions. In this model a bank will serve simultaneously different types of clients with
possibly contrasting objectives; protecting one party’s interests might therefore mean harming
those of the other party. The starting point is the simple observation that if the bank always
exploited such a conﬂict of interest, there would be no way to justify the existence of universal
banks (at least with rational market participants). Therefore, the model will look at situations
where the bank does not always ﬁnd it convenient to adopt such a “collusive” attitude, but can
also decide to behave more efﬁciently by pursuing both parties’ interest.
In the model, a central role is attached to the level of market sophistication which will
be shown to inﬂuence the efﬁciency of a universal bank. It is not clear what is the level of
sophistication of real world ﬁnancial markets.
5 This is likely to be something not uniform
across countries and strongly correlated with the level of ﬁnancial development.
6 The main
insight of the model is that the desirability of tough regulations imposing the separation of the
different activities of a universal bank is inversely related to the level of rationality of market
participants and, therefore, to the level of ﬁnancial development.
ArecentcontributionbyBolton, Freixas andShapiro (2004)analyzes thisissuein aquite
different set-up. In their model, the seller has better information than the buyer about which
Other conﬂicts of interest, not necessarily connected with universal banks, are those concerning the activities of
insurance, auditing, consulting, and rating. After the recent wave of corporate scandals, conﬂicts of interest at the
interior of corporations have also received a lot of attention. On this see Demski (2003).
5 The existing empirical literature provides unconclusive evidence. Gompers and Lerner (1999), for exam-
ple, show that investors require a discount for initial public offerings in which the underwriter has an equity stake,
supporting the idea that market participants do anticipate the existence of conﬂicts of interest. Kroszner and Rajan
(1997) reach a similar conclusion. On the contrary, Ber, Yafeh, Yosha (2001) shows that the stocks of companies
taken public by their lending bank-afﬁliated underwriter are those with the worst post-issue stock performance.
Puri (1996) shows that investors paid higher prices for securities underwitten by commercial banks, though he
interprets this ﬁnding as evidence that commercial banks provide a certiﬁcation role the market is willing to pay
for.
6 The quality of the understanding of these mechanisms may even vary across the different segments the
entire ﬁnancial market is composed of.9
product is best suited for his needs (the choice could be, for example, between a pension
fund and a life insurance). They distinguish between a specialized bank, which sells only
one product, and a universal bank, which sells both products. The conﬂict of interest consists
in the fact that the former has incentives to conceal its information when it faces a client
whose best choice is not the product it sells (advising correctly would mean losing the client).
The interesting point put forward is that more competition, by reducing the mark-up on the
individual sale, reduces the incentives to conceal information. The reason why this approach
is not ﬁt to analyze the sort of conﬂicts of interest cited above is simply that these are inherent
in the activity of universal banks. In their framework, in fact, the one that is subject to a conﬂict
of interests is the specialized bank rather than the universal bank.
7
On the contrary, the present model starts from the assumption that it is exactly the
pervasive attempt banks are making to supply more and more services, permitted by an intense
process of deregulation,
8 that generates conﬂicts of interest.
To make the exposition more effective, the model is developed keeping in mind the
speciﬁc example in which the bank is simultaneously acting as an underwriter for ﬁrms and as
a mutual fund manager for savers/investors. In these circumstances, the bank is supposed to
sell assets in the primary market at the highest possible price so that ﬁrms’ cost of capital is
minimized, while at the same time it is supposed to buy assets at the lowest possible price so
that savers’ portfolio return is maximized. Clearly, there is a conﬂict of interest between these
two activities: the bank can make its mutual fund buy these securities and, depending on the
transaction price, it will be protecting one party’s interest and harming the other’s (a good price
f o rt h eb u y e ri sn e c e s s a r i l yab a dp r i c ef o rt h es eller). As already pointed out, one important
feature of the model is that the bank is not bound to adopt such behaviour (generically deﬁned
as “collusive”) but can instead decide to execute these transactions with third parties so
that mutual fund investors and issuing ﬁrms’ interests are not always determined by a mere
redistribution of the existing wealth.
Beyond its convenience for the exposition, this example has some economic relevance
which has been documented in few empirical papers. Ber, Yafeh, and Yosha (2001) look at
Israeli IPOs and ﬁnd that the highest “over-pricing” is recorded in cases in which at least
7 On the other hand, the costs associated with the latter are related to their presumably greater market power.
8 For the United States see Barth, Brumbaugh, Wilcox (2000).10
5 per cent of the total volume of the newly issued shares has been bought by mutual funds
controlled by the same underwriters. Guazzarotti (2003) looks at the international market of
private bonds to study the differences in the underwriting activity of commercial and (pure)
investment banks. One result suggests that when banks sell newly issued bonds to mutual
funds they control, this happens at a higher price.
9
2. Common agency
Common agency is the natural theoretical framework one would normally use to study
this kind of issue. This fast growing literature deals with models where one agent is
simultaneously supplied incentive schemes (or “menus”) from different principals who take
their decisions non-cooperatively.
In the model below, the common agent is the bank; this is a clear-cut departure from
classical theories of ﬁnancial intermediation.
10
Broadly speaking, any principal is supposed to choose a contract by maximizing
his expected utility, subject to incentive compatibility and a participation constraint. The
complication with respect to standard moral hazard models is that this is true only for
given principal’s expectations about the contracts that other principals are offering and which
simultaneously determine the agent’s behaviour. This conﬁgures a game where the players are
the principals and the strategy space is the set of contracts they can offer.
In the seminal paper by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the authors use a moral hazard
modelandshowthatthelackofcoordinationamongprincipalsisnotanissueiftheagentisrisk
neutral. It is well known from standard moral-hazard models that under agent’s risk neutrality
(where there are no risk-sharing issues) the agent is given a maximally steep incentive scheme
(i.e. is essentially buying the ﬁrm). This is true even under common agency but, in this case,
the fact that the agent becomes a residual claimant implies that he will internalize not only the
inefﬁciencies stemming from the asymmetric information of the agency relationship, but also
9 However, it is important to emphasize that, like Puri (1996), the author interprets this difference as evi-
dence of the certiﬁcation role carried out by “better informed” banks.
10 In models of delegated monitors (Diamond; 1984), the (commercial) bank is a principal with respect to
borrowers and an agent with respect to depositors. In models of maturity transformation (Diamond and Dybvig;
1983), the bank is a principal with respect to both depositors and borrowers (though in the original contribution
the contractual relationship on the lending side is not modelled).11
the ones related to the lack of coordination among principals. It is worth mentioning this as it
will be shown below that there are different ways to generate this efﬁciency result.
A m o n go t h e r s ,t h em o r er e c e n tw o r kb yM a r t i m o r t( 1 9 9 6 ) ,b a s e do na na d v e r s es e l e c t i o n
model, clearly points out the importance of collusion in common agency. The idea is that one
of the principals can make side contracts with the agent on the basis of private information.
The present model offers instead a simple way to deﬁne collusion in a moral hazard-
common agency set-up. The main point is that it is precisely when collusion is allowed (that is,
under a so-called “conﬂict of interest”) that inefﬁciencies may disappear. The difference with
respecttoBernheimandWhinston(1986)isthatsuchanefﬁciencyresultistotallyindependent
of the (agent’s) risk neutrality. The difference with respect to Martimort (1996) is that there
collusion always decrease the principals’ pay-off.
It is important to note the difference of focus with respect to the model of conﬂicts of
interestdevelopedinDewatripontandTirole(1999). Whilebothframeworksrefertosituations
with multiple tasks, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) use a multiple agent set-up and study how
efﬁciency changes across the different combinations of tasks that individual agents can be
assigned. In this way they leave out the issues of contractual externalities
11 and of collusion
12.
For the sake of simplicity a number of more technical aspects are left out of the picture.
One is the distinction between intrinsic or delegated common agency (i.e. the fact that the
outside option of the agent does or does not include the possibility to contract with only one of
the principals).
13 Another is the difﬁculty stemming from the fact that the revelation principle
(as it is known in the standard agency models) does not hold. This is due to the possibility
of offering contracts that depend on the other principals’ contracts (and this complicates
substantially the analysis since the latter depend, in turn, on the former, creating an inﬁnite
regress problem).
14
11 Any agent is a party to one contract at most.
12 As already pointed out, the deﬁnition of collusion adopted below is intrinsically connected with the fact
that the agent is serving more principals simultaneously.
13 See Calzolari and Scarpa (1999).
14 On these issues see for example Martimort and Stole (2003) and Peters (2001).12
It is worth mentioning the alternative deﬁnitions of collusion provided in related strands
of the literature.
15 One category of models considers situations with one principal, one agent
and one supervisor, whose only role is to diminish the amount of asymmetric information
afﬂictingthe principal-agent relationship. Collusion in this context is seen as the possibility for
theagent tomakesidepaymentstothesupervisorinexchangefor notrevealingtheinformation
acquired. A similar category includes the multi-agent models, where each agent has a piece of
private information on some underlying variable. Again, the agents might make side payments
among themselves, in exchange for not revealing this information.
16 All these deﬁnitions of
collusion differ from the one introduced below which refers to a moral hazard-common agency
framework.
3. The model
Let us consider a bank that is active in the market of fund management and, at the same
time, as an underwriter for companies who want to go public or which are issuing bonds. This
means that the bank is buying assets on behalf of savers/investors and selling assets on behalf
of ﬁrms. Denote Di > 0 t h es u mt h eb a n ki se n t r u s t e dw i t hb yp r i n c i p a li,f o ri =1 ,2 (in the
example, D1 c a nb es e e na st h ev a l u eo ft h es h a r e so f f e r e di nt h eI P Oa n dD2 as the money
raised through the mutual fund).
It is plausible to assume the existence of some moral hazard: the bank can carry out
these services more or less effectively (by obtaining better or worse terms in the transactions
it concludes), and this depends on how much costly effort is spent. Suppose, for the moment,
that the bank operates with ﬁrewalls so that the two functions are carried out independently
and denote Yi the gross returns the bank is able to generate. In symbols, we assume that
Yi = Di (1 + m) where m, the rate of return, is a stochastic variable equal to M>0 with
probability a and 0 otherwise and that a ∈ [0,1], representing non contractible costly effort, is
chosen by the bank.
The universal bank, in the absence of ﬁrewalls, can exploit its conﬂict of interest and,
i n s t e a do ft r y i n gt oﬁnd the best counterparts in the market for all its clients, it can execute
this transaction internally; in the example, it can make its mutual fund select the shares it is
15 A complete survey on this is in Tirole (1992).
16 Think of the example of an auction.13
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selling on behalf of the issuing ﬁrm. This is what is called collusion and which models the
conﬂict of interest: if the bank colludes with the issuing ﬁrm it sells these shares at a high
price to its mutual fund; if it colludes with the mutual fund’s investors the price will be low.
In symbols, the actual return for principal i when the bank can collude, denoted Ri,c a nb e
written as follows:
½
R1 =( 1− |c|)Y1 +m a x{0;c}(D1 + D2)
R2 =( 1− |c|)Y2 − min{0;c}(D1 + D2)
In these expressions c ∈ {−1,0,1} is an indicator of collusion. When c =0t h e r ei sn o
collusion and the gross return to principal i is given by Yi.W h e nc =1(respectively −1), the
bank is said to collude with principal 1 (2) in the sense discussed above: the former does not
go on the market and just transfers the sums D2 (D1)f r o mp r i n c i p a l2 (1)t op r i n c i p a l1 (2).
In order not to deal with discrete variables and to capture the idea that collusion can
occur with different intensities, the bank is assumed not to choose a value for c,b u ti n s t e a d
a distribution on its support. We can deﬁne z1 = prob(c =1 ) , z2 = prob(c = −1),a n d
1 − z1 − z2 = prob(c =0 ) , which all take values in the interval [0,1].
17
The timing is as follows: ﬁrst, for any possible value of Ri, each principal decides the
fee Wi (Ri); second, the bank chooses a level of efforta; third, the bank observe the realization
of m; fourth; the bank chooses a distribution z which is therefore a function of m.
18 Figure 1
summarizes the time sequence.
17 There are alternative ways to eliminate the model discreteness. An advantage of this formulation is that it
allows sensible equilibria with positive “amounts” of collusion with both principals.
18 The interpretation of this feature relies on the fact that usually these services are provided continuously
over time so that, at the moment of the decision about c, the bank possesses some more information. This
additional information can change its perception of the returns to be gained on the market upward or downward,
and this is something which affects its propensity to collude.14
Being risk neutral, at any stage the bank maximizes the expected value of:
ub = W1 + W2 − ψ(a) − φ(z)
where ψ(a) and φ(z) are two positive and increasing functions. ψ(a) represents the cost of
effort and φ(z) the reputation loss the bank can expect to incur if it colludes.
19
Principals anticipate the moral hazard they face in terms of effort and collusion and try
(non-cooperatively) to inﬂuence the bank’s behaviour through incentive schemes in order to
maximize the expected net return Ri − Wi.F o r m a l l y ,g i v e nWj,p r i n c i p a li solves:
max
Wi,a,z(m)
EaEz(m)[Ri − Wi | m]] s.t.
a =a r g m a x
a0
Ea0[Ez(m)[ub | m]]
z (m)=a r g m a x
z
Ez[ub | m]
Ea[x] denotes the expected value of a variable x which depends on m when
prob(m = M)=a; Ez[x | m] denotes the expected value of a variable x which depends
on c when prob(c =1 ) = z1 and prob(c = −1) = z2.T h e ﬁrst is a standard incentive
compatibility constraint. The second is a peculiar incentive compatibility constraint, requiring
principal i to take into account how the bank will determine z.
20
The solution of the above maximization problem provides the best response of principal
i to principal j’s strategy. The equilibrium of the model is just the Nash Equilibrium of this
“contract game”, that is the intersection of the two best responses.
21
19 It is not difﬁcult to interpret a cost function which is deﬁned in terms of probabilities, if one considers that
φ can be generated as the expected value of an opportune function of c.
20 For the sake of notational simplicity, optimization problems with respect to z do not recall any time that z
takes values in the unit simplex {z | 0 ≤ z1 ≤ 1,0 ≤ z2 ≤ 1,0 ≤ 1 − z1 − z2 ≤ 1}. Analogously, given that we
will assume π(a)=a, the latter will also have to be included in the interval [0,1].
21 It is important to note that this model implicitely assumes the absence of renegotiation between the bank
and the two principals. Since collusion is an ex post inefﬁcient activity, if renegotiation were possible, collusion
would always be avoided. This could be justiﬁed by arguing that in more sophisticated environments the presence15
Few comments are useful. First, while effort a is never contractible, it will be interesting
to compare all possible alternatives concerning the contractibility of z (or equivalently of c)
and the case where z is contractible will represent the situation in which effective ﬁrewalls are
set up in order to eliminate the conﬂict of interest.
Second, it is useful to point out that implicit in this formulation is the assumption that
effort is a public good.
22 This feature is necessary to have clear-cut conclusions of welfare
analysis, but it is not indispensable in order to generate the main model’s insight.
Third, it is convenient to restrict the analysis to a simpliﬁed case in which M =1and
D1 = D2 = D. The effect of these hypotheses is twofold. On one hand they allow attention
to be restricted to symmetric equilibria which are easy to identify for reasons that will be
explained.
23 On the other hand, they make both Rist a k ev a l u e si nt h es e t{0,D,2D} so that,
in principle, Wi (a function of Ri) is a vector of three numbers which, in the present set-up, is
the simplest case preserving economic meaning.
24
Fourth, it is also necessary to assume that the bank beneﬁts of limited liability: Wi ≥ 0.
When Ri =0one can infer without ambiguity that c 6=0 .I ns u c hac a s e ,as u f ﬁciently large
punishment would prevent the bank from choosing c 6=0and collusion would just disappear.
However, this type of unambiguous inference is possible only thanks to the model simplicity
(three outcomes) and not in more general settings. In order to rule out this artiﬁcial solution,
Wi’s are bounded to be non negative.
25
Finally, in order to obtain analytic solutions, ψ is assumed to take the following form
ψ(a)=k
2a2, whichis a well-behavedfunction, standardintheliterature. Moreover, in orderto
of some asymmetric information at time t =3would prevent renegotiation from taking place.
22 For example, one can suppose that effort represents the quality of the personnel hired which may have a
positive impact on both functions. Alternatively, it may be assumed that effort can be spent in general adminis-
trative cost reduction activities or that the common agent may invest in general purpose R&D.
23 As shown in Appendix A, none of the results depend on the assumption of symmetry.
24 In standard moral hazard models, two outcome technologies are a the simplest device to study the phe-
nomenon of incentive provision without entering into more technical aspects of mechanism design related to the
possibility of using complex shapes for the incentive schemes.
25 Note that, contrary to what happens in standard moral hazard models, the assumption of limited liability
would remain necessary even in case of a risk averse agent.16
avoid uninteresting corner solutions it is possible to impose k ≥ 2. With no loss of generality,
it is also possible to ﬁx D =1 .
3.1 The social optimum
The efﬁciency of any decentralized equilibrium has to be evaluated against the ﬁrst best
allocation. This is characterized by the values of a and z which maximize the sum of the
utilities of the agent and of the principals, the expected value of EaEz(m)[R1 + R2 − ψ(a) −
φ(z) | m]].
In aggregate, having c 6=0is an unproductive redistribution of wealth if m =0 , while it
i sal o s si fm =1(total return would be 2 instead of 4). Having prob(c 6=0 )is always costly
(φ > 0). These two remarks are sufﬁcient to show that the optimal collusion policy in the ﬁrst
best is z1 = z2 =0 . With this result, the optimal level of a is given by the solution to:
max





The ﬁrst order condition of the above maximization problem is 2=ka.
26 The
interpretation is standard: on the left of the sign of equality there is the marginal beneﬁto f
a, which is the difference from the total return in state m =1and in state m =0 . Optimality
requires this quantity to be identical to the marginal cost of effort. The explicit solution is the
positive quantity aFB =2 /k, a decreasing function of k, which is the parameter measuring
how costly effort is.
3.2 Equilibrium with ﬁrewalls
It is instructive to solve the model assuming that z is exogenously set to its efﬁcient level
(zi =0for i =1 ,2). This case represents the situation where the presence of conﬂicts of
interest is contrasted by the introduction of effective barriers between the different activities
carried out by the universal bank, and which prevent it from adopting collusive strategies at the
expense of some of its clients. In the ﬁnancial press, these are often referred to as “ﬁrewalls”.
27
26 Second order conditions are satisﬁed.
27 The actual separation of the activities can take place in different forms implying different levels of effec-
tiveness. Between the extreme cases of universal and specialized banks, one can consider the holding company
with separate subsidiaries, or the company with operating subsidiaries. A discussion on this is in Shull and White
(1998). The term “ﬁrewalls” here has an even more general connotation, denoting any kind of organizational17
In these circumstances, Ri takes value in the set {1,2}. Given that the only reason for
paying something to the bank is to induce the desired level of a, one can solve by imposing
Wi (1) = 0.C a l l i n gwi = Wi (2), the bank solves:
max

















which produces a best response for principal i of the form wi (wj)=( 1 − wj)/2 for
i =1 ,2 and j 6= i. Using this equality and focusing on the symmetric equilibrium where
w1 = w2 = w, the equilibrium fees are equal to w =1 /3.
The equilibrium level of effort turns out to be aNC =2 /(3k).
3.3 Equilibrium with one principal
Suppose that the two principalsc o o r d i n a t es oa st ob e h a v ea so n e .T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
am o d e lw h e r eas i n g l ep r i n c i p a lm a x i m i z e s the sum of the two payoffs, choosing both w1 and
w2. Even though this case is not meant to represent any real world situation, it is instructive to
compare the allocation of its equilibrium with other cases.
Giventhat, whatevertherealizationofm,h a v i n gc 6=0canatmostleavethesumR1+R2
unchanged, imposing z =0is without loss of generality. This gives, as above, Wi (1) = 0 and












device capable, at least to some extent, of eliminating the conﬂict of interest.18
where wT = w1 + w2. Now the solution is wT =1 with an implied level of effort
a = a1P =1 /k.
The comparison of the three cases gives aFB =2 /k > a1P =1 /k > aNC =2 /(3k).
This clearly shows that beyond the standard moral hazard loss of efﬁciency (aFB >a 1P)
there is an additional loss due to the lack of coordination among the principals (a1P >a NC).
As argued above, the source of this inefﬁciency is the positive contractual externality that an
increase of one wi creates on the other principal, given that a enters both utilities (effort is a
public good).
3.4 Equilibrium without ﬁrewalls
In this case principals behave non-cooperatively and the bank can collude with any one
of them. In order to get an analytical solution φ i st a k e nt ob ee q u a lt oφ(z)=h
2 (z1 + z2)
2
with h>0, a natural extension of the cost function ψ if z1 and z2 are perfect substitutes.
Moreover, it is assumed that the bank cannot recei v eap o s i t i v ef e ei ft h en e tr a t eo fr e t u r nf o r
the client is negative. Taken together these two assumptions bring a remarkable simpliﬁcation.
In particular, they imply the following restrictions on the contract space: Wi (0) = Wi (1) = 0
and wi ∈ [0,1]. Appendix A shows that none of them is necessary to get the model results.
Now, it is possible to compute the equilibrium of this case by backward induction. First,
we compute the optimal collusion policy for any given level of effort and couple of contracts.
Second, wecomputetheoptimallevelofeffortanticipatingtheimpliedcollusionpolicy. Third,
we ﬁnd the equilibrium of the contract game.
3.4.1 T h ec h o i c eo fc o l l u s i o n( t =3 )
At this stage, for anygivenrealizationofmand for a ﬁxed a, the bank solves max
z Ez[ub |
m].I fm =0 ,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o :
28
max





28 For notational simplicity, the formulas in the text will only be those for the case in which the constraint
z1 + z2 ≤ 1 is not binding. The propositions will also provide the results for the case in which it is binding (h
small).19
Perfect substitutability among z1 and z2 implies that if wi >w j,t h e nzj =0 .W i t h
this restriction, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to zi gives the solution zi = wi/h.I f
wi = wj = w, then the above objective function can be seen as depending only on zT = z1+z2




If m =1 , the maximization problem is:
max





For any value of w1 and w2, the partial derivatives of this objective function with respect
to bothzisi sa l w a y sn e g a t i v es oi nt h i sc a s et h es o l u t i o ni sz1 = z2 =0 .
The interpretation is intuitive: whenever market conditions are good (and how likely
this is depends on how much effort the bank has previously exerted), the bank chooses not to
collude and to accomplish both tasks it has been assigned. On the contrary, when m is low, it
will decide to collude with the party that is granting it the highest payoff.
This simple result expresses the idea that conﬂicts of interest can have a negative impact
on ﬁnancial stability. Given that returns from collusion do not depend on market conditions,
it is precisely when m is already low that collusion becomes a dominant strategy, thereby
exacerbating initial difﬁculties.
Before going to the next step it is useful to calculate the value function of this problem.




1/(2h) if m =0
w1 + w2 if m =1
29 As shown in Appendix A, dropping the assumption of perfect substitutability also eliminates this indeter-
minacy.20
3.4.2 T h ec h o i c eo fe f f o r t( t =1 )
A tt h i ss t a g et h eb a n kh a st od e c i d eal e v e lo fa anticipating that, once m is observed






. Still keeping the convention w1 ≥ w2, this can be written as:
max











The solution is given by the quantity a =[ w1 + w2 − w2
1/(2h)]/k, which is decreasing
in k as intuition would suggest. The sign of the derivatives with respect to the wis deserves
a comment. The derivative with respect to w2 is, as in the previous cases, equal to 1/k.T h e
derivative with respect to w1 is positive, (weakly) decreasing, and always smaller than in the
case without conﬂicts of interest. Now, an increase in w1 (by deﬁnition the larger of the two)
has two effects. On the one hand, as before, it makes effort more productive since it increases
the pay-off the bank receives with m =1 . On the other hand, it also increases the pay-off from
collusion and this in turn reduces the beneﬁt of a higher effort, since the bank colludes only
with m =0 .
3.4.3 Contract game (t =0 )
At this stage the two principals play the contract game simultaneously, deciding wi while
taking into account how this is going to affect a, z and taking as given the opponent’s action
wj.F o ra n yi and j 6= i,p r i n c i p a li maximizes:
max
Wi,a,z(m)
Ea[Ez(m)[Ri − Wi | m]] s.t.






0 if m =0 or wi <w j
wi/(2h) if m =1 and wi = wj
wi/h if m =1 and wi >w j
In general we should proceed by computing the best responses and ﬁnding their
intersection. The simplifying assumptions used bring the following proposition which avoids
a lot of awkward algebra.21
Proposition 1 In the contract game that principals play in the case with conﬂicts of interest,
there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with w1 = w2 < 1.
Proof. First, zi (1) = 0 implies that Eπ(a)[Ez(m)[Ri − Wi | m]] = a(2 − wi)+
(1 − a)(1− wi + zi − zj). Second, while a is a continuous function of both wis, z has a
discontinuity precisely at wi = wj. At this point, zi − zj =0a deviation to wi+ ε,w i t hε an
arbitrarily small positive quantity, makes zi − zj jump to (wi + ε)/h > 0. This means that
from wi = wj < 1 there are always proﬁtable upward deviations.
The intuition underlying this result is that of the Bertrand competition: the strategy of
overbidding the opponent by offering a slightly higher fee is always dominant, since it makes
the bank shift its collusion strategy in favour of one principal and not of the other (like the
ﬁrms in a Bertrand duopoly that get all the market by slightly underbidding the competitor).
This proposition is useful since it naturally suggests that the only candidate for a
symmetric equilibrium is precisely w1 = w2 =1 , the upper bound for the wis thanks to
the restrictions on the contract space. The conditions under which this is true are collected in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 w1 = w2 =1is an equilibrium of the contract game under the following
conditions:
A. if h ≥ 1, whenever k ≥ 2h − 1+5 /(8h);
B. if h<1, whenever k ≥ 1+h(4 + h)/8.
30
The proof simply consists in checking that from w1 = w2 =1there are no proﬁtable
downward deviations and it is presented only for the case h ≥ 1 (the case h<1 can be proved
in the same manner).
Proof. Given h ≥ 1, ﬁxing wj =1 ,w eh a v ea =( 1+wi − 1/(2h))/k and zi − zj = −1/h
for any wi < 1. Using these expressions, it can be seen that the maximum utility that principal
i achieves in the region [0,1[ is at wi =3 /(4h). The implied (constrained) value function
is at most equal to the utility at wi =1 ,w h e r ea =( 2 − 1/(2h))/k and zi − zj =0 ,i f
k ≥ 2h − 5/(8h).
30 It can be seen that, given k ≥ 2, the inequality k ≥ 1+h(4 + h)/8 is always satisﬁed for any
h<1.22
The conditions for the existence of the symmetric equilibrium w1 = w2 =1can be
interpreted in the following manner. By deviating to wi =3 /(4h) (the local maximum in the
region 0 ≤ wi < 1 and wj =1 ), principal i’s net pay-off increases when m =1( h ep a y sl e s s
to the bank) and decreases when m =0(the bank colludes with principal j). This deviation is
not an improvement only if the probability of m =1is sufﬁciently low, which is the case when
k is large. On the other hand, for given k,t h i si sm o r el i k e l yt h el o w e rh is, that is the higher
the probability that the collusion with j actually takes place. The properties of the equilibrium
found are collected in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Given the conditions of proposition 2, the case without ﬁrewalls has the
following symmetric equilibrium:
A. w1 = w2 =1 ;
B. a = aCO =
½
(2 − 1/(2h))/k if h ≥ 1
(1 + h/2)/k otherwise
C. zi = zCO
i =
½
1/(2h) if h ≥ 1
1/2 otherwise
In equilibrium, effort is a decreasing function of k and collusion a decreasing function of
h. A less intuitive result is that, for given k, effort is an increasing function of h:b yd e c r e a s i n g
h, the bank’s payoff for m =0increases since it is less costly to exploit the conﬂict of interest
and the beneﬁts of effort diminish. The following proposition compares the allocations of the
different cases studied.
Proposition 4 The following relationships hold:
A. aFB >a CO >a 1P >a NC;
B. aCO −→
h→0





aFB,a n dprob(c =0 )=1− z1 − z2 −→
h→∞
1.
The main result to be emphasized is that the equilibrium without ﬁrewalls is
characterized by a level of effort which is greater than the one obtained with ﬁrewalls
(aCO >a NC) but also by a higher level of collusion (zi > 0). In other words, it can be
said that conﬂicts of interest pose a trade-off between ex ante and ex post efﬁciency.
31
31 In a different context, Kofman and Lawarrée (1996) also design a model where allowing some collusion
is optimal. Models with equilibrium collusion are also those with a principal-supervisor-agent structure where
there is some uncertainty about the collusion technology; see Tirole (1992). However, in these models collusion23
It is also interesting to note that the allocation without ﬁrewalls can be made arbitrarily
efﬁcient, both in terms of the zisa n do fa,a sl o n ga st h eb a n kc a nb em a d ea r b i t r a r i l ya t t a c h e d
to its “reputation”, though these results depend on the assumption of perfect substitutability
across the zis.
32
Until now the direct costs of collusion have been neglected. Depending on the speciﬁc
case considered or on the interpretation of the function φ(z), this could be unsatisfactory.
Taking into account the direct costs of collusion simply means considering that an increase in
h, beyond the positive (indirect) effect through a and z,a l s od e t e r m i n e san e g a t i v e( d i r e c t )
effect through φ(z)=h
2 (z1 + z2)
2. S i n c eap r i o r ii ti sn o tc l e a rw h a tt h en e tr e s u l to f
these effects is, it becomes interesting to compare the different allocations on the basis of the
level of social welfare achieved. The result of this comparison is presented in the following
proposition, where Ue is the sum of expected utility of the two principals and of the bank in
equilibrium e,f o re ∈ {FB,NC,1P,CO}.
Proposition 5 Given the conditions of proposition , the following relationships hold:
A. UFB >U 1P > max(UCO,UNC);
B. if h ≥ 1: UCO >U NC whenever k<16
9 h − 1
4h;
C. if h<1: UCO >U NC whenever k<1 − h
4 + 7
9h.
The interesting results of the above proposition are those concerning the comparison
between UCO and UNC, which say that the introduction of ﬁrewalls can reduce total welfare.
This is more likely, the smaller k is: when k is large, the optimal a is anyway so small that the
indirect beneﬁts associated with the conﬂict of interest (which takes a closer to its ﬁrst best
level) are also small, while the costs remain unchanged.
3.5 Equilibrium with a naive player
This section considers the case where one principal (say i =2 ) plays as if he were in
t h ec a s ew i t h o u tc o n ﬂicts of interest (or as if the ﬁrewalls were completely reliable), while the
is always inefﬁcient in the sense that, if contractible, the principal would always set it equal to zero. Optimal
collusioncaninstead beobtainedinmulti-agent models ifthe agents share some private information(for example,
if agents can monitor each other’s level of effort). See Holmström and Milgrom (1990), and Varian (1990).
32 See Appendix A for a detailed discussion on this point. Moreover, the results about the comparative statics
with respect to h are less powerful than they look: the comparison, in fact, should be done only in the portion
of the parameter space in which the existence conditions of proposition 2 are satisﬁed, so the approach of the
equilibrium without ﬁrewalls to the ﬁrst best cannot be complete.24
other correctly anticipates both the conﬂict of interest and the equilibrium strategy of principal
2.
The solution of this case is meant to show the effect on the overall efﬁciency of the
equilibrium when some of the players are naive and do not realize that the bank might collude
with other parties.
In the previous sections the allocative efﬁciency of the equilibrium is preserved (if not
increased) even in the presence of conﬂicts of interest. On the contrary, this will generally not
be true with naive players. By comparing the two cases, one obtains a theory on the role played
by policies to improve market transparency (for example, better and more detailed ﬁnancial
reports or standardized contracts), which can reasonably be regarded as means to increase the
level of market participants’ sophistication.
It should also be emphasized that the term naive must not be taken literally since it is
subject to different and more general interpretations. For example, it could also represent a
situation in which one of the parties is formed by a multitude of small agents (in the usual
example these could be individual savers investing in a mutual fund) suffering from some
coordination failure (for instance, because there are costs to obtain information or to take
a c t i o n sw h i c ha r en e g l i g i b l ef o rt h ee n t i r es et of agents but not for individual ones).
Under these circumstances, the equilibrium strategy of principal 2 is easily found
since, by deﬁnition, the naive player plays as in the model without conﬂicts of interest:
w2 = wNC
2 =1 /3.















0 if m =0 or w1 < 1/3
w1/h if m =1 and w1 ≥ 1/3
33 The expression for a uses the conjecture w1 ≥ 1/3, which is checked in the proof. We avoid all possible
issues caused by the discontinuity of the utility function of principal 1 at w1 =1 /3 by assuming that the bank
colludes only with principal 1 even for w1 =1 /3. When the solution turns out to be exactly equal to w1 =1 /3
(as will be the case in some regions of the parameter space), it will have to be meant as 1/3 plus a positive and
arbitrarily small quantity.25
On the one hand, the way in which a depends on w1 and w2 remains unchanged; on the
other hand, the principals play wis strictly smaller than the equilibrium levels of proposition
2( w2 =1 /3 < 1 and w1 ≤ 1). This is sufﬁcient to establish that the level of effort in the
equilibrium with one naive principal, denoted aNA,w i l la l w a y sb es m a l l e rt h a naCO.
The following proposition states under what conditions the loss of efﬁciency is so great
that effort drops even below aNC, the lowest level of the different cases studied above.
Proposition 6 Given the existence conditions of proposition 2, aNA satisﬁes the following
properties:
A. if h ≤ 3/4 then aNA <a NC;




such that aNA <a NC if and only if k<k min (h)+d(h),w h e r ekmin (h) is the minimum
level of k satisfying the existence conditions of .
Proof. See Appendix B.
The main result is that, even neglecting the direct costs of collusion (φ), in the case with
a naive player the loss of efﬁciency can be considerable: effort can be even smaller than aNC
(the lowest level until now) with, at the same time, a positive level of collusion. Only for some
choice of the parameters, the presence of second order effects of the choice of z1 make sure
that aNA can be greater than aNC.
To obtain the intuition of this result it is useful to note that now principal 1 knows that
by deviating even slightly above 1/3 he can reap all the beneﬁts of the conﬂict of interest
(the bank will collude only with him). However, principal 1’s best response is not necessarily
equal (or, more precisely, arbitrarily close) to 1/3 since he could be interested in raising w1 to
a higher level. This is done not so much in order to increase the level of effort, but rather to
raise the level of collusion (if principal 1 c a r e do n l ya b o u ta and not about z, he would also
play as in the case without conﬂict ofinterest, where w1 =1 /3). Nonetheless, such an increase
in w1 c a nh a v eap o s i t i v ee f f e c to nt h el e v e lo fe f f o r t. This (second order) effect is larger, the
larger h is, that is the larger the w1 that principal 1 has to pay in order to get the desired level
of collusion.26
4. Conclusions
The paper develops a suitable framework to analyze the incentives driving the activity of
universal banks, generally intended as institutions providing services to different parties with
potentially contrasting interests, that is under a so-called conﬂict of interest.
From a purely methodological perspective, the novelty consists in having introduced an
intuitive way to deﬁne collusion in a moral hazard common agency model, previously deﬁned
only with adverse selection. A common agent that is allowed to collude in this sense is said to
be subject to a conﬂict of interest.
Moreprecisely, theconﬂict ofinterest ismodelled asa technologywhichallows thebank
(the common agent) to operate a costly redistribution of wealth from one client to another (the
principals). The bank has alternative options other than just exploiting the conﬂict of interest
(that is, other than actually colluding). In particular, it can decide instead to exert costly effort
and try to pursue the interest of both principals.
The model is built by keeping in mind a speciﬁc example of conﬂi c to fi n t e r e s t( b e t w e e n
the activities of mutual fund management and securities underwriting) but it offers more
general insights concerning universal banks and, after due reinterpretation, even institutions
operating in different environments.
34
These are the main conclusions. (1) With sophisticated (rational) players, the presence
of a conﬂict of interest increases the slope (the power) of the incentive schemes provided in
equilibrium. (2) In situations where these would otherwise be too ﬂat (for instance because
e f f o r ti sap u b l i cg o o d ) ,t h ec o n ﬂict of interest can produce ex ante beneﬁts (greater effort)
w h i c hh a v et ob eb a l a n c e dw i t hi t se xp o s tc o s t s (the probability that the bank actually
colludes). (3) These beneﬁcial effects disappear in situations where at least one of the
principals is naive and does not take into account the presence of the conﬂict of interest.
34 For instance, instead of having principals providing explicit incentive schemes in the form of fees, they
might be carrying out some costly monitoring which directly affects agent behaviour in terms of effort choice
and collusion. Moreover, although the model uses explicit incentive provision, it could be adapted to a version
with implicit incentives (where the agent works hard in order to raise market perception about his quality). If the
results for the different tasks (the services provided to the different principals) are not unrelated (for example,
because effort can be spent in generic cost reduction activities), the attempt by the individual principal to make
inference about the agent’s ability by using information on the results obtained for all tasks would generate the
positive externality leading to an overall higher level of effort.27
The model can help to shed some light on important aspects of the policy debate. A
ﬁrst basic question is why institutions subject to conﬂicts of interest do exist despite the
presence of those conﬂicts of interest. The model supplies two alternative explanations. If
market participants are sophisticated, this can happen because these institutions actually are
efﬁcient. As also emphasized in Crocket et al. (2003), the existence of conﬂicts of interest
does not necessarily imply that they will be exploited given that the bank is also interested
in maintaining its market reputation. On the contrary, with naive players, although these
institutions are not (socially) efﬁcient they are likely to get extra-proﬁt sa n dt os u r v i v ei n
competition with the efﬁcient ones. A similar conclusion can be found in Rajan (1998), who
argues that if the product market is not perfectly competitive it does not lead to a selection of
efﬁcient ﬁrms.
A second question concerns the desirability of some regulatory intervention. Again,
if market participants are not naive, any intervention is irrelevant or even detrimental for
allocative efﬁciency. For example, it is documented that before the Glass-Steagall Act
commercial banks’securitiesafﬁliatessoldassetswithlowerdefaultratesthanpureinvestment
banks.
35 An important piece of evidence is that the market seemed able to detect situations
where the conﬂict of interest was acute and responded by requiring higher yields. On the
other hand, more recent experience of the conﬂict of interest afﬂicting the activity of equity
research in investment banks shows that these institutions have occasionally been able to
mislead clients on initial pubic offerings.
36 In the case of naive players, the model states
that public intervention in terms of transparency requirements or in the more ﬁerce form of
ﬁrewalls and separation, is always desirable.
Third, the model helps to understand what kind of intervention is best. In this regard it
shows that policies for transparency (if interpreted as those which let unsophisticated players
realize the existence of a conﬂict of interest
37)i m p r o v ee f ﬁciency with naive players, and
35 Kroszner and Rajan (1997).
36 See The Economist (2002).
37 There are several examples, some already adopted in some legislations. Financial analysts could be forced
to declare if they have any direct or indirect connection with the companies they follow. Mutual funds could
be be forced to reveal if they invest in shares of companies which have relevant business relationships with
afﬁliated commercial banks. If the naive principal is a metaphor for a set of dispersed and small players suffering
from some lack of coordination, measures of this type are those which help them to coordinate (for example, by
imposing the nomination of a representative).28
are irrelevant with rational players.
38 On the other hand, ﬁrewalls (which are deﬁned as all
organizational measures effectively preventing collusion from taking place, as happens with
specialized banks) are welfare improving only with naive players but can be harmful with
sophisticated agents.
Overall, it seems possible to state that while transparency requirements are always
(at least weakly) beneﬁcial, the desirability of more drastic measures such as ﬁrewalls and
separation is likely to be greater in less ﬁnancially developed economies.
39 This could explain
why, differently from what happened in the United States after the 1929 ﬁnancial crisis which
brought in 1933 to the passing of the Glass-Steagall Act imposing the separation of functions,
the reaction to the recent wave of ﬁnancial scandals has been much more oriented towards
policies of transparency requirements and information disclosure.
40
A further interesting insight is that universal banks can generate some concern about
ﬁnancial stability. An immediate result of the model is, in fact, that the universal bank’s
incentives to collude are low when market conditions are good (m =1 ) and are high when
they are bad (m =0 ). Increasing inefﬁciencies in the ﬁnancial sector during periods of low
expectations may exacerbate natural economic ﬂuctuations.
41 This remark is interesting since
it shows a mechanism which can counterbalance the positive effect universal banks would
exert on ﬁnancial stability thanks to their more diversiﬁed revenues and more stable proﬁts.
5. Appendix A
This section deals with the case φ(z)=h
2 (z2
1 + z2
2),i nw h i c hz1 and z2 are not perfectly
substitutable. It will be shown that this simp l ec h a n g em a k e st h em o d e ln o ta st r a c t a b l e
38 This conclusion neglects the direct costs for the implementation of these measures, which can be substan-
tial.
39 This reasoning presumes that in the model a small h and a large k is a metaphor for an economy with an
underdeveloped ﬁnancial sector. While k could be seen as a proxy of the level of productivity of the ﬁnancial
sector, h could measure the capacity to enforce contracts.
40 It could be argued that the feasibility of trasparency requirements is related to the level of technological
progress in the ﬁnancial industry. On the types of intervention adopted after the recent wave of scandals see, for
example, The Economist (2004).
41 From the observation of recent episodes one could argue that all misbehaviors took place when markets
were bullish, in contradiction with this feature of the model. This incongruity vanishes if one takes into consider-
ation that, as many times reported in the ﬁnancial press, during the upsurge of the speculative bubble investment
bankers were conscious that many of the assets promoted would have eventually caused losses.29
as when φ(z)=h
2 (z1 + z2)
2, but also that the main conclusions remain unaltered. The
usefulness of this version is connected with the fact that, contrary to what happens with perfect
substitutability, its solution does not require the assumption that payments can be positive only
if returns are also positive.
First, it can be noted that the allocations of the ﬁr s tb e s t ,o ft h ec a s ew i t hﬁrewalls, and
of the case with one principal remain unchanged since they are not affected by the shape of
φ(z) (z1and z2 are always set to zero). In order to study the case with collusion we start by
keeping the assumption that Wi (1) = 0.
When m =1the bank never colludes. On the contrary, when m =0 , the bank chooses
a level of collusion equal to zi = wi/h (we keep the notation Wi (2) = wi) no matter whether
wi i sg r e a t e ro rs m a l l e rt h a nwj (this is the direct effect of having abandoned the assumption
of perfect substitutability).
42 W i t ht h e s ev a l u e sf o rt h ezis, the optimal level of effort amounts
to a(w1,w 2)=( ( w1 + w2) − (w2
1 + w2
2)/(2h))/k. For given principal j strategy, principal i
best response is given by the following maximization:
max
Wi,a,z(m)
EaEz(m)[Ri − Wi | m]] s.t.
a =
¡











zi = wi/h for i =1 ,2
with EaEz(m)[Ri − Wi | m]] = a(2 − wi)+( 1− a)[zi (2 − wi)+( 1− zi − zj)].T h eF O C
for this problem, together with the assumption of symmetry wi = wj, leads to an equilibrium
level for wi and wj which is denoted w∗.
43 This, in turn, implies an equilibrium level of
effort which is denoted a∗ = a(w∗,w ∗). It can be seen that for any admissible choice of
h and k, a∗ > 2/(3k), which is the level of effort in the case with ﬁrewalls. This simple
42 To avoid corner solutions we assume k ≥ h ≥ 2.
43 In particular, w∗ =
3 √
D/18 − 2F +( 1+7 h)/9 where: D = −156h − 444h2 + 756kh − 1512kh2 +
476h3+8+36
√
d; d =1 2 kh−15h2−270kh2−351h6+288k3h3+708k2h4+180kh5+606h5−1140k2h3−
585h4 + 393k2h2 + 414kh3 +6 6 kh4 + 306h3; F = 13h+18kh−22h2−1
9
3 √
D . It can also be veriﬁed that the second
order conditions are satisﬁed.30
remark corroborates the main result found in the case with perfect substitutability, which is the
existence of a trade-off between the level of effort and the level of collusion.
The main difference with respect to the case with perfect substitutability concerns the
sign of the derivatives da∗/dh, which now is negative. In general, there are two countervailing
effects. One is the direct effect already pointed out: by decreasing h, the bank’s pay-off for
m =0increases since it is less costly to exploit the conﬂict of interest and the beneﬁts of effort
diminish. The other (indirect) effect goes through the determination of w∗:i fh increases, for
a given wage schedule, the amount of collusion decreases. This implies that the returns for
principal i of paying wi conditional on m =0(the returns obtained when the bank colludes in
his favour) diminish. The optimal wi t h e r e f o r ed i m i n i s h e sa n dt h i sa l s oh a san e g a t i v ee f f e c t
on a. This indirect effect was absent in the case with perfect substitutability since Bertrand
competition implied a w which is invariant with respect to h (w =1 ,f o ra n yh and k satisfying
the existence conditions).
44
Although for simplicity we have maintained the assumption of symmetry, this appendix
also shows that the main conclusions are robust in this respect as well. In fact, this version of
themodel doesnot presentthediscontinuityof thezishighlightedinsection3.4.1; accordingly,
it can be argued that the above equilibrium will change only marginally if, in order to introduce
some asymmetry, the set of parameters is marginally changed.
45
Finally, in order to show that the results are not intrinsically dependent on the restriction
Wi (1) = 0,
46 we can give a numerical example: suppose that h =4and k =5 .I t c a n b e
seen that if principal j’s is forced to play the equilibrium strategy (Wj (0) = Wj (1) = 0 and
Wj (2) = w∗), the partial derivative of principal i’s expected utility with respect to Wi (1) is
44 Furthermore, havinga decreasingin heliminates anapparent incongruence (or discontinuity) of the model
with perfect substitutability. Having the condition aCO −→
h−→∞
a1P (with a1P >a CO) may be seen in contrast
with the fact that the allocation with ﬁrewalls (which is characterized by a level of effort aNC such that aNC <
aCO) could be seen as the allocation where it is inﬁnitly costly to collude (h −→ ∞).
45 This does not mean that asymmetry does not play any role in the model but only that the equilibrium
found is not strictly connected with the assumption of symmetry, as one could suspect by looking at the case with
perfect substitutability.
46 Wi (0) is equal to zero in any case since there is no reason to pay when returns are at their lowest level.31
negative for any (Wi (1),W i (2)) ∈ [0,1]
2.
47 Values of Wi (2) ∈ [1,2] can be neglected since
these can never be optimal.
48
6. Appendix B
This section presents the proof of proposition 6. Suppose h>1 and make the conjecture
that w1 ≥ 1/3. Compute the expected utility for principal 1, denoted U1 (w1),u s i n gt h e
expressions for a and z given in paragraph 3.5. It can be seen that U1 (w1) is a fourth degree
polynomial with a unique maximum in the interval w1 ∈ [1/3,1]. Then compute the level
of w1, denoted w◦, in the interval [0,1] satisfying a =2 /(3k), the level of effort in the
equilibrium withﬁrewalls. It can be seen that U0
1 (w◦) < 0(which is equivalent to aNA <a NC)
i fa n do n l yi fk−kmin (h) <d(h),w h e r ed(h) is the solution to the equation U0 (w◦)=0once
the parameter k is substituted with the expression k = d+ kmin (h) (the root is unique since in
the region d>0 and h>0, which is where the existence conditions are satisﬁed, U0 (w◦) is
increasing both in h and in d). To see that w1 < 1/3 (which implies a change of the collusion
strategy of the bank since w1 <w 2 =1 /3)c a n n o tb eo p t i m a l ,i ti ss u f ﬁcient to verify that
U0
1 (w1) is positive for any w1 ∈ [0,1/3].I fh<1/3,i ti si m m e d i a t et ov e r i f yt h a taNA <a NC
no matter the value of w1.F o rh ∈ [1/3,2/3],i ti ss u f ﬁcient to verify that even the maximum






/k, which is the level of a for any
w1 in the interval [h,2/3]) cannot be greater than 2/(3k).F o rh ∈ ]2/3,3/4] by proceeding
as in the case h>1 i tc a nb es e e nt h a tU0
1 (w◦) < 0 for any h and d (given that h<1,t h e
expression for kmin change as indicated in proposition 2). Finally, for h ∈ ]2/3,1],w ea r ei na
case which is similar to that of h>1; again, the only difference is in the expression for kmin
as indicated in proposition 2.
47 This check requires taking into consideration that bank’s behaviour changes when Wi (1) > 0.
48 They imply an expected pay-off which is less than 1 and therefore lower than the level achieved by playing
Wi (1) = 0 and Wi (2) = w∗.References
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